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ABSTRACT
This article offers an analysis of the effectiveness of Norway’s readmission agreements with
Iraq and Ethiopia. Through the use of readmission agreements, Norway aims to reduce irregu-
lar presence by increasing the number of both voluntary and forced returns, as well as discour-
age future irregular migration by sending a “clear signal” to individuals without protection
needs that they will be returned when their asylum applications are rejected. The effectiveness
of these agreements thus lies in the extent to which they fulﬁll these objectives. While
Norway’s agreements with Iraq and Ethiopia have been explicitly highlighted as effective by
Norwegian authorities, this article argues that readmission agreements may be expected to
limit, but not to eliminate, return problems. Readmission agreements, however streamlined,
will have different effects on different groups. It ﬁnds that Norway’s readmission agreements
have been only partially successful with Iraq, and wholly unsuccessful with Ethiopia.
INTRODUCTION
Like many other European countries, Norway has long attempted to control migration ﬂows to and
from the country. In September 2008, after a period of surging asylum arrivals, the Norwegian gov-
ernment announced a list of thirteen restrictive measures designed to limit the number of asylum
applications and to increase the return irregular migrants. Two points on the Government’s list
referred to achieving bilateral readmission agreements with countries of origin. Today, concluding
such agreements with countries outside the European Union (EU) is among the Norwegian govern-
ment’s top priorities (Janmyr, 2014: 182), even being mentioned in the Government’s 2013 Political
Platform (Government of Norway, 2013). While Norway’s early agreements were largely ad-hoc in
nature, following the development of a comprehensive and result-oriented readmission policy in the
early 2000s, it began to conclude agreements at relative speed. In 2005 alone, Norway entered into
six bilateral readmission agreements, bringing the total number of readmission agreements (or other
agreements containing a readmission clause) to 16 (AD, 2006: 3). By the end of 2013, the total num-
ber of readmission agreements had increased to 29. As such, Norway has one of the highest numbers
of readmission agreements in Europe (Janmyr, 2014). But how well do such agreements really work?
Readmission agreements are one of the oldest instruments used by states to control migratory
ﬂows (Coleman, 2009). Such agreements help governments to overcome bilateral difﬁculties by set-
ting out reciprocal obligations on the contracting parties (as well as detailed administrative and
operational procedures) to facilitate the return of persons who do not fulﬁll the condition of pres-
ence in the requested state (JD, 2010: 187). Aiming to inﬂuence migration ﬂows both to and from
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the country, readmission agreements are generally seen as “essential tools” in the “ﬁght against
immigration” (Council of the European Union, 2011: 2). By increasing the number of returns and
by sending a “clear signal” to individuals without protection needs that they might be returned
when their asylum applications are rejected, these agreements are widely believed to reduce irregu-
lar presence and discourage future irregular migration (EMN/PU, 2012: 13; Janmyr, 2014: 185).
Norwegian authorities have often argued that readmission agreements contribute towards lowering
the number of asylum seekers in Norway, and a 2012 agreement with Ethiopia has been explicitly
highlighted as an example whereby the conclusion of an agreement has signiﬁcantly reduced the
number of Ethiopian asylum seekers in Norway (JD, 2012: 200). Norway’s agreement with Iraq,
entered into in 2009, has likewise been used to exemplify how both forced and voluntary returns
from Norway have increased following the conclusion of the agreement (EMN/PU, 2012: 47).1 Par-
ticular claims have also been made that readmission agreements contribute to a greater number of
voluntary returns from Norway, and that rejected asylum seekers from countries with which there
are readmission agreements tend to use the assisted voluntary return schemes more frequently than
when no agreement is in place (AD, 2008: 328; JD, 2012: 200). These ideas generally correspond
well with the prevailing assumptions by other European countries that the conclusion of readmis-
sion agreements leads to the implementation of more returns (Coleman, 2009: 58).
Despite the general presumptions about their usefulness, no comprehensive studies have been
conducted relating to the effectiveness of readmission agreements, neither in Norway nor on a glo-
bal scale. This is the precise focus of the current article, which aims to contribute to this ﬁeld of
knowledge by exploring the effectiveness of Norway’s readmission agreements with Iraq and Ethio-
pia. Through a qualitative and quantitative study it examines whether Norway’s readmission agree-
ments with Iraq and Ethiopia have fulﬁlled their stated objectives, i.e. whether the agreements can
be said to have led to a decrease in asylum ﬂows and/or an increase in the number of forced and
voluntary returns to these speciﬁc countries. When doing so, it concentrates on the socio-political
context of implementing Norway’s readmission agreements with these two countries.
This article begins with a discussion of the methodological and theoretical framework applied in
this study. Following this, two case studies are explored: Iraq and Ethiopia. In each case study,
both asylum arrivals to Norway and voluntary and forced returns from Norway are examined and
contextualized with a view to shedding light on the effectiveness of readmission agreements in
these sectors. A ﬁnal section offers concluding remarks.
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
How do we measure the effectiveness of readmission agreements? In light of several studies pointing
to the difﬁculties of establishing causality between policy and outcomes, the effectiveness of migra-
tion policies in general has become widely contested, not the least because the term “effectiveness”
requires an evaluative and subjective dimension to the analysis (Czaika and de Haas, 2013: 491). In
contrast to the term “effect”, which is linked to the actual effect a policy might have, the term “effec-
tiveness” focuses on a desired effect and thus establishes a relation to policy objectives. Thus, the
effectiveness of readmission agreements lies in the extent to which they fulﬁl their objectives (Castles,
2004: 207). Within this framework, effectiveness refers to the relation between the objectives of poli-
cies on paper and actual migration ﬂows, with the effectiveness of policies being potentially under-
mined by gaps in implementation and efﬁcacy. Thus, while some studies argue that migration policies
do have a signiﬁcant effect on migration (Hatton, 2009; Ortega and Perri, 2013) on a global level,
there appears to be a growing conviction among policymakers that migration policies do not produce
the generally desired outcomes (Jandl, 2007). Rather, migration has been seen as driven by economic,
demographic and political processes in the societies of origin/destination that are far beyond the scope
2 Janmyr
© 2015 The Authors International Migration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
International Organization for Migration
of migration policies (de Haas and Czaika, 2013; Castles, 2004; Cornelius et al., 2004). That said,
there is often also a discrepancy between publically stated and “real” objectives of migration policy
(Czaika and de Haas, 2013: 491); some have even argued that such policies are merely symbolic, and
that governments are actually more concerned with the perceptions of their electorate than with pursu-
ing effective policies (Gibney and Hansen, 2003).
With regard to the effectiveness of return policies or readmission agreements, few studies exist.
One important exception nevertheless questions the alleged vital effect of EU readmission agree-
ments on return practice, and argues that as long as the problems that cause people to leave their
countries and migrate towards the EU continue to persist, it is unlikely that readmission agreements
will function as a deterrent (Trauner and Kruse, 2008: 434). It furthermore argues that readmission
agreements will not substantially decrease the ﬂow of irregular migrants into the EU, and that
unless readmitted persons receive meaningful reintegration support, readmission agreements will
not work. To date, however, there appear to be no studies that examine the successful reintegration
of deported people back into their communities of origin (Schuster and Majidi, 2013: 14). In the
Norwegian context, Cathrine Eide’s study (2013) of the unintended effects of Norway’s readmis-
sion agreement with Ethiopia importantly demonstrated that migration policy may have effects both
on ﬂows and in the society, and that it is vital to include both receiving and sending states’ per-
spectives when assessing policy outcomes.
Assisted voluntary return programmes have been more frequently evaluated in terms of their effec-
tiveness. One recent study argues that voluntary return programmes are an important element in the
policy mix that can reduce the number of irregular migrants, and, if successful, they could also dis-
courage returned migrants from once again leaving their countries of origin and thus help reduce new
asylum ﬂows (Black et al., 2011). However, this same study also ﬁnds that such programmemes gen-
erally do not attract large numbers of migrants, do not result in major development gains for countries
of origin, and have limited impact on the behaviour of returned migrants (i.e. they might re-migrate).
The complex nature of migration policies nevertheless poses signiﬁcant dilemmas in terms of method-
ological choices and conceptualization, and such problems often lead to inconclusive evidence of the
effectiveness of migration policies (de Haas and Czaika, 2013: 41). In this article, the migration policy
under scrutiny is narrowly restricted to concern two speciﬁc readmission agreements between Norway
and Iraq and Ethiopia. The focus on these two cases is explained, as pointed out above, by the fact that
Norwegian authorities have portrayed each, in one way or another, as having been successful, i.e. effec-
tive with regard to the stated objectives. With the exception of Norway’s agreement with Russia (regret-
tably not within the scope of this study), the Norwegian government has refrained from making public
statements as to the effectiveness of its other readmission agreements. Considerable – and critical –
media attention to the agreements with Iraq and Ethiopia is a further factor that warrants this examina-
tion. No other agreements have received nearly as much national media attention as these.
This study combines quantitative data (statistics) and qualitative data (interviews and written
material). The combination of these two methods in migration research has been considered impor-
tant in order to strengthen the overall analysis (de Haas and Czaika 2013: 42). Qualitative literature
on policy implementation provides an awareness of the political and social context in which migra-
tion policies are implemented and, as such, will enhance the capacity to interpret results of quanti-
tative analyses. The aim is to achieve a more reliable assessment of policy effects. In other words,
this method might help explain changes in both the number of asylum arrivals to Norway and the
number of forced and voluntary returns from the country. In this study, interviews were conducted
with key informants working in the asylum ﬁeld, including civil servants within the Ministry of
Justice (JD), Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) and the International Police Immigration
Service (PU), as well as with NGO representatives. Representatives from the International Ofﬁce of
Migration (IOM), the operational partner on assisted return for the Norwegian Immigration authori-
ties, as well as researchers with country-speciﬁc knowledge, were also interviewed. Written materi-
als such as Norwegian government reports and media reports have been analysed.
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For the quantitative aspects of this study, statistics have been achieved from PU, UDI, and
UNHCR’s Statistical Online Population Database. However, in both industrialized and developing
societies, reliable statistics on population movements are notoriously difﬁcult to calculate (Crisp,
1999: 6). Many ﬁgures are not readily comparable, and statistics are confused as the legislative cat-
egories used to quantify these individuals change frequently (Havinga and Bocker, 1999: 48). A
slight divergence between UNHCR’s statistics on the number of asylum seekers to Norway and the
ﬁgures provided by the UDI was noted. As explained to the author by UNHCR, this can be due to
two reasons: retroactive data revisions by the Norwegian authorities which did not reach UNHCR
prior to the release of UNHCR statistics; or that the ofﬁcial Norwegian ﬁgures include repeat appli-
cations, i.e. the applicant has lodged more than one application during the reference period.2
UNHCR strives to present the new intake, thereby excluding repeat applications.
NORWEGIAN READMISSION AGREEMENTS: REDUCING IRREGULAR
PRESENCE AND DISCOURAGING FUTURE IRREGULAR MIGRATION?
Iraq
In May 2009, Norway and Iraq signed a readmission agreement that entered into force on the day
it was signed and that opened for the return of Iraqi nationals lacking legal residence in Norway
(MFA, 2009). This agreement is one of Norway’s more ambiguous; upon Iraqi request, it was
drafted in a manner that aims at downplaying, and ends up effectively concealing, the fact that it
concerns the forced, and not only the mere voluntary, return of Iraqi nationals (Janmyr, 2014: 196).
Although it is not conﬁdential, for several years it was also deliberately withheld from all websites
providing public access to Norwegian bilateral agreements and other legislation.
There have been many large-scale waves of emigration from Iraq over the last decades, and Iraqi
nationals have constituted the largest group of asylum seekers in Norway during the greater part of
the last decade (Castles and Miller, 2009; Strand et al., 2011: ix). While Norwegian statistics gener-
ally do not differentiate between individuals from Iraqi Kurdistan and those from areas under the
administration of the Baghdad-based Government of Iraq, people of Kurdish descent have formed
the majority of Iraqis in Norway. In contrast to other parts of Iraq, where the rate of acceptance
has been higher, only a small percentage of Iraqi Kurds have actually been granted asylum in Nor-
way (Thorbjørnsrud et al., 2013: 18–9).
FIGURE 1
TOTAL NUMBER OF ASYLUM ARRIVALS FROM IRAQ AND ETHIOPIA WORLDWIDE 2004–2013
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We see a notable rise in the number of Iraqi asylum arrivals to Norway in the year before the
signing of the readmission agreement (Figure 2). Migration researchers and Norwegian authorities
alike have attributed this increase to the stricter policy towards Iraqis in neighbouring Sweden,
including the signing of a readmission agreement between Sweden and Iraq in February 2008
(Brekke and Aarseth, 2009: 42). While the number of Iraqi asylum rejections in Norway soared in
2008 and 2009, a distinctive decrease in the number of asylum arrivals began in 2009 and contin-
ued into 2014 (Figure 2). Even though these asylum arrivals decreased after the signing of the
readmission agreement in mid-2009, the greatest decrease in arrivals appears to have begun before
the readmission agreement was signed and immediately after it was signed. This drop in arrivals
appears too soon to be attributed to the readmission agreement.3 Moreover, this decrease is largely
reﬂected in a downward trend for Iraqi asylum applications on a worldwide basis (Figure 1), which
is why it is currently difﬁcult to attribute the decrease in Norway to the readmission agreement.
Interestingly, the 2013 rise in Iraqi asylum applications worldwide is not reﬂected in Norwegian
statistics, and, in 2014, the number of Iraqi asylum arrivals to Norway continued to decrease.
On a worldwide basis, and if compared with the total number of Iraqi refugees, the number of
returnees to Iraq has generally been very limited (Strand et al., 2011: viii). While Norwegian
authorities experienced considerable difﬁculties in their attempts to forcibly return Iraqi nationals
prior to the 2009 agreement – indeed, the number of forced returns remained stable at between 10
and 20 each year, and most of these were of convicted criminals – the readmission agreement
appears to have had a direct and immediate effect on Norway’s practice of forced return to Iraq
(Figure 2). Immediately after the signing and entry into effect of the agreement, Norwegian authori-
ties intensiﬁed forced returns to Iraq, even directly contradicting the recommendations made by
UNHCR and other human rights organizations to halt all returns to ﬁve central Iraqi governorates,
including Baghdad (UNHCR, 2009; Norwegian People’s Aid, 2009).4 In December 2009, a char-
tered ﬂight to Iraq forcibly returned 30 individuals, approximately half of the total number of
forced returns in 2009 (Strand et al., 2011: 18). Subsequent years saw a manifestly sharp rise in
forced returns, leading many to view the readmission agreement as successful and well-functioning
(Norwegian ID Centre, 2013: 27–29).5 During this period, the generally good relations between
Norway and Iraq probably increased the number of forced returns.
FIGURE 2
MIGRATION FLOWS IRAQ – NORWAY 2004–2014*
*The vertical dotted line indicates year when Norway-Iraq readmission agreement was signed.
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Since 2011, however, the readmission agreement has been difﬁcult to implement, and forced
returns have subsequently become more challenging to realize.6 The decline in the number of
forced returns from Norway to Iraq in 2012 may be ascribed partially to the fact that the difﬁcul-
ties in returning Iraqi nationals before the signing of the readmission agreement in 2009 had led
to the accumulation of a considerable “pool” of potential Iraqi returnees in Norway. Once the
agreement entered into force, however, Norwegian authorities could fairly easily return individuals
already identiﬁed for return. With the decline in the number of individuals identiﬁed for return
by Norwegian authorities, the actual number of forced returns also decreased. In addition, many
of the remaining Iraqis in Norway are families and youths, and these are difﬁcult to forcibly
return.7 Having said that, many of the reasons why forced returns from Norway have declined
are to be found in the internal political situation in Iraq, which has also inﬂuenced the quality of
the general relations with Norway. The Government of Iraq in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regio-
nal Government (KRG) have experienced increasing political tensions and internal splits, and
both entities have diverged in their views of forced returns. The KRG has regarded forced returns
as a violation of human rights, and has also complained that European countries have not negoti-
ated the practice of forced return with the KRG, in addition to authorities in Baghdad (Thorbjørn-
srud et al., 2013: 35, 42–3; Strand et al., 2011: 13).8 For this reason, since 2010 the KRG has
attempted to halt forced returns to areas under its administration, and has generally only accepted
the forced returns of convicted criminals of Iraqi nationality from Norway. Rejected asylum seek-
ers have largely been excluded, and many chartered ﬂights have reportedly been redirected to
Baghdad.9
Nevertheless, Norwegian authorities currently ﬁnd it easier to cooperate with the Kurdish
authorities than with the Government of Iraq in Baghdad. Since November 2011, the latter has
largely been unwilling to implement the readmission agreement in any form. Iraq’s readmission
agreements with European countries have attracted substantial, and predominantly critical, media
coverage and have also proved to be a sensitive issue in Baghdad politics (Thorbjørnsrud et al.
2013). Allegedly, the Iraqi parliament ordered the Government to refuse to accept forcibly
returned Iraqi refugees and to review certain readmission agreements (Bowcott, 2012). For Nor-
way’s part, Baghdad’s lack of political will to implement the agreement was expressed by the
difﬁculties in verifying the identity of Iraqi nationals, and by Baghdad’s sudden acceptance only
of the forcibly returned Iraqi nationals in possession of Iraqi passports (Norwegian ID Centre
2013: 27–28).10 While Norwegian statistics do not differentiate between forced returns to KRG
and to areas ofﬁcially under the control of Baghdad, in 2013, the number forced returns increased
to 2010-levels (Figure 2). In June 2014 – due to events related to the emergence of the so-called
Islamic State in Iraq – Norwegian authorities indeﬁnitely halted forced returns to eight provinces
in Iraq. This is a major reason to why only 48 individuals were forcibly returned in 2014 (UNE,
2014).
In 2008, the Information, Return, and Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals to Iraq (IRRINI) pro-
grammeme was established to facilitate the voluntary return and reintegration of persons from
Iraq. In connection with the signing of the readmission agreement, Norwegian representatives
expressed a hope that the agreement would contribute to the voluntary return of an increasing
number, and indeed, after the signing, authorities claimed a decisive increase in the number of
programme applications (MFA, 2009; Norwegian ID Centre, 2013: 27–28).11 While Iraqi
nationals have been the most numerous applicants and returnees in Norway’s assisted voluntary
return programmemes (Brekke, 2015:34), the greatest increase in the number of voluntary retur-
nees occurred immediately after the launch of the programme and before the signing of the
readmission agreement (Figure 2). The general improvement in conditions in northern Iraq after
2009, as well as the surge in Iraqi asylum rejections in Norway between 2008 and 2010 have
been identiﬁed as important factors which may have contributed to this increase (Brekke, 2015:
34; Oslo Economics, 2013: 69; Strand et al., 2011: ix). Indeed, more asylum rejections increase
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the pool of people that may choose assisted return. As with the number of forced returns, how-
ever, the number of voluntary returns has also decreased since 2011, with the sharpest drop in
2014.
The varying levels of successful implementation of the Iraqi readmission agreement sheds
light on the temporal aspects of evaluating such agreements – when can we expect to see the
effects of a readmission agreement? State ofﬁcials interviewed in this work claim to have no
temporal aim, but admit that they feel pushed by government politicians to obtain results within
a very short period of time.12 Viewed from a short-term perspective, the readmission agreement
with Iraq may indeed be considered an important milestone in that it paved the way for the
forced return of hundreds of Iraqi nationals in its ﬁrst few years. Once we base our analysis on
a long-term perspective, however, the intended effect of this agreement must be said to be
unfulﬁlled so far.
Ethiopia
In January 2012, Norway and Ethiopia signed a readmission agreement that aimed at facilitating
both voluntary and forced return of Ethiopian nationals residing irregularly in Norway. Having
sought such an agreement with Ethiopia for more than 20 years, the signing was seen as a major
achievement for the Norwegian government (Eide, 2014; Janmyr, 2014: 203ff). Based largely on
a draft proposal brought to the negotiating table by Ethiopian representatives, the agreement is
partially ambiguous and differs considerably in form and substance from Norway’s many other
agreements (Janmyr, 2014: 196). Importantly, it applies only to Ethiopian nationals whose request
for refugee status or residence permit has been rejected. It has also been criticized by the United
Nations Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) and Norwegian
human rights organizations alike for falling short on a number of core human rights standards
(NOAS, 2012; UN OHCHR, 2012). Shortly after the agreement was signed, however, Norway’s
Ministry of Justice and Public Security reported that it had had its anticipated effects in that it
had affected “both asylum arrivals and the number who choose assisted voluntary return” (JD,
2012: 200).
FIGURE 3
MIGRATION FLOWS ETHIOPIA – NORWAY 2004–2014.*
*The vertical dotted line indicates year when Norway-Ethiopia readmission agreement was signed.
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Emigration from Ethiopia has taken place in several different phases since the 1970s, the most
recent of which was characterized by the post-1991 ﬂows that included not only people ﬂeeing
political oppression, but also skilled migrants and family reuniﬁcation cases (Tasse, 2007). A few
hundred Ethiopian nationals have sought asylum in Norway each year, with a steady increase
between 2006 and 2010 (Figure 3). A distinct drop can be observed immediately following the
signing of the Ethiopia-Norway readmission agreement in the ﬁrst quarter of 2012. Some observers
have attributed this decrease to the immediate signal effect of the new policy (Eide, 2014). How-
ever, this drop may arguably also follow the downward trend with regard to Ethiopian asylum
applications that had been ongoing in Norway since 2009, and which largely corresponds to world-
wide trends (Figures 1 and 3). What is interesting, however, is that while Ethiopian asylum trends
on a worldwide basis remained steady in 2013, these ﬁgures increased in Norway by 57 per cent
from 2012. In 2014, the number of arrivals continued to increase quite dramatically.
The number of forced returns from Norway to Ethiopia has long been, and continues to be,
extremely modest, even after the signing of the readmission agreement (Figure 3). The few forcibly
returned Ethiopians have mainly been Ethiopian nationals convicted of crimes, a group that has
generally been unproblematic for Norwegian authorities to readmit, and which falls outside the
scope of the 2012 readmission agreement. Some returns labelled as forced returns in Norwegian
statistics have also been so-called escorted voluntary returns (“ledsaget frivillig retur”), which
involves voluntary return of Ethiopian nationals with the assistance of the Norwegian Immigration
Police.13 Against Norwegian expectations that the readmission agreement would contribute to the
return of more than 700 Ethiopian nationals whose asylum applications had been rejected, these
low numbers can thus only be understood as a considerable disappointment from the perspective of
the Norwegian government. In 2014, not a single Ethiopian national was forcibly returned from
Norway (Figure 3).
When it comes to the number of voluntary returns from Norway to Ethiopia, initially very low,
this has increased since 2009, and most dramatically in 2012 (Figure 3). Norwegian state ofﬁcials
have ascribed this rise to the readmission agreement,14 but because the greatest rise took place
before the signing and entry into force of the readmission agreement, the impact of the agreement
is difﬁcult to conﬁrm, although the number of voluntary returns lay stable in both 2013 and 2014.
It is clear that Norwegian authorities have faced difﬁculties in implementing the readmission
agreement with regard to the forced return of rejected asylum seekers, and these difﬁculties have
contributed to making the agreement one of Norway’s least successful.15 It is generally perceived
that Ethiopian authorities are unwilling to implement the agreement, and several reasons have been
given to explain why this is the case; among them are changes in diplomatic personnel, the death
of President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia in August 2012 and the subsequent political turmoil, and,
interestingly, the number of forced returns to Ethiopia on a worldwide basis.16 Saudi Arabia’s 2013
decision to deport approximately 150,000 migrants back to Ethiopia has clearly put a strain on the
Ethiopian government (Muchler, 2014). While the Ethiopian government has allocated 2.6 million
USD for reintegration projects for what it estimated would be a mere 30,000 migrants, the number
of forced returns to Ethiopia clearly exceeded the anticipated number. Authorities are faced with
rapid urbanization as many returnees prefer to stay in or around the capital or major cities, a factor
exacerbated by the current rate of urban unemployment at 17.5 per cent (Muchler, 2014). In such a
scenario, ﬁnancial remittances from the diaspora constitute an important source of income and con-
tribute to the social investment and development of regions from which the migrants originate. The
Ethiopian government’s apparent unwillingness to adhere to the readmission agreement is perhaps
most blatantly expressed in the unwillingness of the Embassy of Ethiopia to the Nordic countries,
in direct contradiction of the terms of the agreement, to issue identity papers to the rejected asylum
seekers that Norway wishes to forcibly return (Brandvold, 2012).
Considering the unstable start, it is questionable whether the Ethiopian readmission agreement
ever will be implemented as anticipated. If government authorities are unwilling to implement an
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agreement that they just signed, why would these and subsequent governments be more willing to
implement provisions that were agreed under other conditions? As has been pointed out elsewhere,
when it comes to readmission, the question of incentives often lies at the very heart of these rela-
tions (Janmyr, 2014: 197ff). Because readmission agreements and forced return mainly bring about
negative consequences for concerned third countries, unless they receive something worth more in
return, states seldom ﬁnd it worth cooperating in readmission. A few months before the signing of
the Norway-Ethiopia agreement, the Norwegian government had donated approximately 350 mil-
lion Norwegian kroner to forestry, energy- and agricultural projects in Ethiopia. This donation stir-
red certain media attention considering that it was in addition to the 200 million Norwegian kroner
to which the Government had already committed, and despite the fact that countries such as Swe-
den, in response to Ethiopia passing a number of “anti-human rights” laws, chose to considerably
reduce its development aid to Ethiopia. Norwegian authorities were subsequently ﬁercely accused
of trading development aid for readmission, but representatives of the Norwegian government per-
sistently denied any link between the two (Janmyr, 2014: 197ff). It remains unclear to what extent,
if at all, Norway’s development aid may have de facto affected Ethiopia’s decision to enter into the
readmission agreement, and, to what extent this relation may have inﬂuenced the subsequent imple-
mentation of the agreement.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The descriptions and discussions in this article add to the body of knowledge being built pertaining
to the effects of migration policies. The effectiveness of Norway’s readmission agreements with
Iraq and Ethiopia are not readily apparent. The agreements’ effect on asylum arrivals remains
uncertain in Iraq, and in Ethiopia, the number of asylum arrivals in Norway has continued to
increase despite the existence of this agreement. When it comes to return, Norway’s readmission
agreements have been only partially successful with Iraq, and wholly unsuccessful with Ethiopia.
This suggests that claims made by Norwegian authorities that these two readmission agreements
have contributed to a decrease in the number of asylum seekers to Norway from Iraq/Ethiopia, and
to more returns from Norway to Iraq/Ethiopia, do not hold water when confronted with empirical
realities. Rather, this ofﬁcial line appears based on unproven assumptions.
This study furthermore conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings that readmission agreements may be expected to
limit, but not to eliminate, return problems (Coleman, 2009: 318). Readmission agreements, how-
ever streamlined, will have different effects on different groups. As exempliﬁed in the cases of Iraq
and Ethiopia, such agreements cannot guarantee return in all cases and are of limited value when it
comes to overcoming practical obstacles. On the face of it, the main obstacles to the efﬁcient
implementation of many readmission agreements appear to be related to questions concerning the
identity of the returnees, as well as a lack of cooperation on the part of readmitting states. Clearly,
there are factors outside the control of a national government that will inﬂuence the number of asy-
lum arrivals, as well as opportunities for return. Due to factors such as the internal political situa-
tion in Iraq, since 2011, Norway’s readmission agreement with Iraq has been difﬁcult to implement
and forced returns more challenging to realize. Whether or not a readmission agreement will lead
to an increase in forced returns appears often dependent on the quality of the general relations with
the country in question. Iraq’s political situation surely effected its relations with Norway; the
Government of Iraq in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have experienced
increasing political tensions and internal splits, and both entities have diverged in their views of
forced returns. Since 2010, the KRG has attempted to halt forced returns to areas under its adminis-
tration, and has generally only accepted the forced returns of convicted criminals of Iraqi national-
ity from Norway. Since November 2011, the Iraqi government in Baghdad has largely been
unwilling to implement the readmission agreement in any form.
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While Norwegian incentives in the form of development aid were offered to Ethiopia prior to the
signing of the readmission agreement in 2012, it is unclear to what extent Norway’s development
aid may have de facto affected Ethiopia’s decision to enter into the readmission agreement, and, to
what extent this relation may have inﬂuenced the subsequent implementation of the agreement.
Relations between the two countries remain strained, and Ethiopian authorities are currently unwill-
ing to implement the agreement. Several reasons have been given to explain why this is the case;
among them are changes in diplomatic personnel, the death of President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia
in August 2012 and the subsequent political turmoil, and, interestingly, the number of forced
returns to Ethiopia on a worldwide basis.
Thus, however willing Norwegian authorities may be to put in place long-term readmission poli-
cies, international and national political ﬂuctuations, in which migration ﬂows are inﬂuenced by
factors outside of the control of national asylum policies, may indeed restrain governments to
accept the inevitable short-term effect of such readmission agreements. While the possibility should
not be ruled out that that the negotiation of readmission agreements in general may decrease asy-
lum applications and increase the number of returns, there is clearly a need for more research into
the policy-making processes concerning readmission agreements as well as further studies into the
causality between such agreements and asylum seeker ﬂows.
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NOTES
1. Forced returns are commonly deﬁned as the compulsory return of an individual to the country of origin,
transit or third country, on the basis of an administrative or judicial act, while voluntary returns are to be
seen as the assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or third country, based on the
free will of the returnee. The voluntariness of such voluntary returns has frequently been questioned (Web-
ber, 2011). For these deﬁnitions, see also the IOM’s Glossary on Migration (2011).
2. Personal correspondence, UNHCR Statistics (8 Aug 2014).
3. Interview. Researcher (27 Aug. 2014).
4. The general view was that these returns contradicted UNHCR’s recommendations to grant refugee status
or to afford international protection through the application of the extended refugee deﬁnition to Iraqis
who originate from these ﬁve governorates.
5. Interview. PU(b). (7 Oct 2014).
6. Interview. JD. (1 Oct. 2014).
7. Interviews. JD. (1 Oct. 2014); Researcher (27 Aug. 2014).
8. Both Kurdish media and politicians have evoked normative arguments against deportation that run directly
counter to the perspectives dominant in European, Australian and American immigration debates, i.e. that
all forced returns violate human rights, people should be free to move, and, more implicitly, decent and
well-integrated people do not deserve deportation.
9. Interview. PU (a). (7 Oct 2014).
10. Interview. PU (a). (7 Oct 2014).
11. As for voluntary returns to Iraq, recent studies have suggested that participating in voluntary return pro-
grammemes is generally not regarded as voluntary, in fact, it is often referred to as a deportation and sur-
rounded by stigma and shame (Thorbjørnsrud et al. 2013: IX).
12. Interview. JD. (1 Oct. 2014).
13. There may be many reasons to why PU will accompany an individual in these cases; s/he may have a psy-
chiatric illness or it may be for the simple reason that the International Organization for Migration, which
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usually assists in voluntary returns, is not present in the readmitting country, as in the case of Ethiopia.
Interview. PU(b). (7 Oct 2014).
14. Interview. PU(b). (7 Oct 2014).
15. Interviews. JD. (1 Oct. 2014); PU(b). (7 Oct 2014).
16. Interview. PU(b). (7 Oct 2014).
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